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Now, when a man has been underestimated by a friend, he has some cause for taking offense – since it is our 
friends who should overestimate our capacities. They should have an exaggerated opinion of our moral fortitude, 
our aesthetic sensibilities, and our intellectual scope. Why, they should practically imagine us leaping through 
a window in the nick of time with the works of Shakespeare in one hand and a pistol in the other!   
– Amor Towles, A Gentleman in Moscow 
 
 
 
People sometimes do not achieve their goals or live up to their commitments. This 
remark is not meant to be as cynical as it might sound.  Often, we simply change our minds 
about what to strive for, or exit one commitment in order to take up another.  This might be 
the result of one’s view about what is worth doing in life evolving over time.  Most of us never 
achieved our childhood goals of being firefighters or astronauts, but this is simply because 
these goals were replaced by others that came to be seen as more appealing.  In other cases, 
we discover that our abilities, opportunities, or capacity for self-discipline are just not well-
suited for our aspirations of novel-writing or marathon-running.  This need not mean that it 
was a mistake to adopt the end in the first place, although it might have been; it is often 
unclear at the outset what the likelihood of success in some endeavor is, and so perhaps 
reasonable to try.  The point is simply that we sometimes do not end up doing what we set 
out to do, especially when our goals are lofty. 
Given this, suppose a person – call them ‘A’ – adopts a goal, say, to finish a doctoral 
dissertation that their Ph.D. committee will accept as passable.  What should you believe 
about whether A will succeed?  The seemingly obvious answer is “whatever the total 
accessible evidence supports.”  The relevant evidence will include the statistics on completion 
rates, especially in A’s field.  It will include facts about A’s capacity for skillful and original 
scholarship, argumentation, and writing, as well as any considerations bearing on A’s 
potential for improvement.  It will include facts about A’s circumstances, including the 
supportiveness and fairness of the committee, A’s financial security, and so forth.  And it will 
include facts about A’s level of commitment to finishing, in the sense of how much of a 
priority it is, as well as A’s propensity to procrastinate and otherwise succumb to temptation 
at the expense of getting any writing done.  Solely this and any other information relevant to 
A’s prospects should determine what you believe about the probability that A will complete 
a passable dissertation. 
 The much less obvious answer we aim to explore here is “it depends on your 
relationship with A.”  We normally think of allowing our beliefs to be influenced by our 
personal relationships and emotions as the paradigmatic case of epistemic irrationality, 
insofar as our relationships and emotions are irrelevant to the truth of those beliefs.  When 
it comes to our friends, family members, colleagues, patients and mentees, it might be that 
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we have ethical or practical reasons to act as though we are more optimistic about their 
prospects than we really are, in order to be supportive.  We should tell them that we believe 
in them, that they can do whatever they put their mind to, and that where there’s a will, 
there’s a way.  But if the question is whether what we actually believe should be influenced by 
our partiality toward certain people, the presumptive answer is ‘no.’ 
A powerful motivation for denying that our beliefs should be partial to our significant 
others1 is the conviction that there cannot be practical or ethical reasons that bear directly 
on the question of what to believe.  If there were, the thought goes, we would be unable to 
respond to them in deliberation, or consciously hold our beliefs on the basis of them.  To 
deliberate about what to believe just is to deliberate about what is true, and the question of 
what is true cannot be answered by appeal to considerations bearing on what is useful or 
valuable.2  And reasons for belief, one might think, must be the kind of thing that we can 
consciously believe for. 
 Whether or not this line of thought is ultimately correct, we will assume for the sake 
of argument that there are no practical or ethical reasons for belief, or requirements of 
practical rationality that take beliefs as their direct objects.  Our interest is in whether some 
degree of epistemic partiality toward our significant others’ aspirations can be vindicated 
without appeal to the controversial claim that our beliefs ought sometimes to be based on 
practical or ethical considerations.  Thus, for all we will say here, the first “Evidentialist” 
answer offered above is correct if the question is “what should you think about when deciding 
what to believe about A’s prospects?”  However, we will argue that this does not settle the 
original question concerning what you should in fact believe.  To answer that question, one 
must ask whether there can be legitimate practical or ethical influences on the standards by 
which we reason about what to believe.  We will suggest that there can be.  We will then attempt 
to open the door for the possibility of epistemic partiality by considering the case in which A 
is oneself.  We will argue (drawing on previous work) that we are epistemically justified in 
reasoning differently about the evidence bearing on the prospect of succeeding in our own 
difficult, long-term endeavors than we would reason about a stranger’s prospects given the 
same evidence.  We will then return to the case in which A is neither yourself nor a stranger, 
but someone you have a significant relationship with.  When our significant others set out to 
do something difficult, should we reason about the likelihood of their success more as we 
would about a stranger’s, or more as we would about ourselves? 
 Our question is a specific instance of a general topic inspired independently by Sarah 
Stroud and Simon Keller:  do the norms of friendship require doxastic practices that conflict 
with epistemic norms?3  Stroud and Keller each argue that they do.  But Stroud in particular 
focuses on a case in which one receives evidence concerning an event that has already 
happened – it is alleged that a friend has behaved badly, and you must decide what to believe 
                                                   
1 A hideous phrase, but useful for referring to the category of important relationships that is wider than 
friendship. 
2 For example, Shah (2003). 
3 Keller (2004); Stroud (2006) 
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in light of that evidence.  In contrast, our focus is specifically on how to think about the agency 
of our significant others, the results of which lie in a not-yet-determined future.  In this 
respect, our topic is similar to that raised by Chapter Seven of Berislav Marušić’s book 
Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving (2015).  Marušić, however, 
constrains his remarks to cases in which the other has promised one that he will succeed, or 
otherwise invited the other to trust and rely upon him.  Our interest is in a more mundane 
and less ethically loaded kind of case in which there is no promise or invitation to rely; we 
simply come to know in some way or other that a friend has the end of writing a passable 
Ph.D. thesis, or running a marathon, or losing twenty pounds.  Could it be that our 
relationships obligate us to “believe in others” even in these cases? 
 
I.  Evidential thresholds 
 
 The first question is whether and how practical and ethical considerations can play a 
role in determining what a thinker ought to believe.  We have assumed that they cannot play 
the role of reasons for belief.  However, they might legitimately play a role in shaping the 
standards that structure our reasoning.  To see the difference between reasons and standards, 
think about Achilles and the Tortoise.  The norms and principles that govern how we draw 
conclusions from our “premises,” or reasons for belief, cannot themselves feature in 
reasoning as premises.  Rather, they operate in the background of our reasoning, guiding us 
in our responses to the evidence we explicitly consider. 
 One such standard of reasoning concerns the thinker’s sensitivity to new evidence.  
How much evidence does she require in a given context before she comes to a conclusion 
about what to believe, or revises a previously-held belief?  Call this the thinker’s “evidential 
threshold” with respect to a given question in a given context.  The important point for our 
purposes is that evidential thresholds are not fixed across contexts; they go up and down.  A 
vivid example of this concerns the sensitivity of our thresholds to what is at stake in getting 
the right answer (though it is not essential to our view that the reader accept this form of 
“pragmatic encroachment”).  If there is little at stake, the thinker might have a relatively low 
threshold, such that she will go ahead and update her beliefs in light of fairly weak evidence.  
In other, high-stakes cases, her threshold will be higher, such that the evidence must be 
strongly compelling before she commits to a conclusion.  It will be useful to talk about the 
way in which a thinker’s evidential thresholds adjust to the context as being governed by 
general “evidential policies” that the thinker has, although in using this terminology, we do 
not mean to suggest that the thinker actually reflectively adopts these standards.  Rather, it 
is simply a way of modeling the fact that our evidential thresholds systematically respond to 
certain relevant features of the thinker’s context.4   
                                                   
4 Though perhaps not exhaustively; there will likely be other factors that illicitly influence a thinker’s evidential 
thresholds. 
 4 
 With these tools at our disposal, we can now ask:  what kinds of considerations bear 
on whether a thinker has the evidential policies that she ought to have?  In other words, what 
sorts of factors should influence how our evidential thresholds behave across contexts?  Our 
view grants to the Evidentialist that on a first pass, a rational evidential policy will be 
concerned only with truth or accuracy, given the thinker’s cognitive limitations, time 
pressures, and other such constraints.  An evidential policy will be better to the extent that it 
leads a cognitively and temporally limited thinker like ourselves to respond to her evidence 
in a way that will be more accurate or truth-conducive.  Thus, two equally rational epistemic 
policies cannot differ in the overall expected accuracy of the attitudes they prescribe given a 
fixed body of evidence. 
However, we suggest that it is implausible to suppose that these purely epistemic 
considerations will suffice to pick out a uniquely best evidential policy to have, especially 
when it comes to contexts that require making predictions about what agents will do in the 
future.5 Indeed, it is difficult to see what kind of objective fact could ground the unique 
rationality of an evidential policy, independently of our interests and the way we choose to 
frame our hypotheses.6  And as William James famously argued, a concern for truth does not 
in itself determine precisely how one ought to trade off caution and adventurousness. Thus, 
we submit that there will frequently be more than one rationally permissible epistemic policy 
available from the point of view of truth or accuracy.  This means that equally rational 
thinkers can have different thresholds for belief change in a given context, such that they 
disagree about exactly what counts as evidence that is compelling enough to form or revise 
a belief on that basis. 
 When there are multiple evidential policies that are rationally permissible for a given 
thinker to have from the point of view of purely epistemic considerations, we suggest that 
practical and ethical considerations can and should play a role at that point in deciding 
between epistemically permissible policies.  Once the epistemic reasons run out, a policy is 
better to the extent that it is ethically superior, or advantageous to us in achieving our non-
epistemic goals.7  The leeway here is constrained,8 and on our view, it will not be the case 
that we should ever trade accuracy for advantage.  Still, it is a way in which practical 
considerations can matter for what we believe without acting as reasons for belief.9   
                                                   
5 This is effectively a rejection of the so-called Uniqueness Thesis:  that there is in every case a uniquely rational 
doxastic attitude to adopt in light of a body of evidence.  See White (2005); Kelly (2013). 
6 Titelbaum (2010); Schoenfield (2014). 
7 One might ask: “epistemically better, or practically better?”  On the approach we are advocating, this is not 
a clear distinction at the level of the standards that govern reasoning.  It is better epistemically, in that it is 
better as a standard of theoretical reasoning, and it is better practically, in that it is better in light of practical 
considerations.  Simply put, it is better qua evidential policy.  Thanks to Hille Paakkunainen and Sigrún 
Svavarsdottír for pushing us to clarify this point. 
8 It would be nice to be able to say how limited.  We see no good way of doing that, except to say that the 
considerations that support Permissivism over Uniqueness do not favor versions on which there is only a narrow 
latitude over versions that allow for significant disagreement (see Schoenfield (2014)). 
9 Here, we echo Hawley (2014) and Kawall (2013), who also point out that the denial of the Uniqueness thesis 
will be relevant to the question of whether it is epistemically permissible to use different standards in the case 
of one’s friends than one does in the case of non-friends.  
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II.  “Grit” and epistemic resilience 
 
 In light of the apparatus introduced in Section I, how should we think about the 
scenario in which the agent who has adopted a difficult, long-term goal is oneself?  The first 
thing to notice is that when people fail to accomplish these kinds of ends, it is frequently in 
part because they at some point abandoned them.  Of course, this will not always be the case; 
if the goal has a strict deadline, or if there is a particular make-or-break opportunity that will 
never be repeated, then it is possible to fail without ever giving up on the goal.  But many of 
our aspirations are not as specific as this.  We aspire to run a marathon at some point, or to 
become a commercially successful comedian eventually, or to defend a dissertation in the next 
few years.  As long as it is possible to keep pursuing the goal after encountering setbacks or 
failing at particular attempts, the decision to give up will be part of the explanation for why 
the agent never pulled it off. 
 The significance of this point is that perseverance, or “grit,” is necessary for success.10  
It is certainly not sufficient, and it is sometimes not even a good idea.  We can rightly abandon 
our goals when we have compelling reason to believe, in light of our abilities or 
circumstances, that we are unlikely to succeed even if we do continue to try.11  There might 
be other options that are also good and more likely to work out.  That said, the disposition 
to give up easily, as soon as one encounters setbacks, is very costly:  it will prevent us from 
achieving difficult ends or maintaining relationships over the long term, even if we value 
these projects and relationships very highly.  Without grit, such accomplishments and 
relationships would be accessible to us only if a good deal of luck clears our path of the 
obstacles and rough patches that such pursuits normally involve.  The capacity to persevere 
in the face of obstacles is thus generally advantageous to us (in many contexts, at least).12 
 Elsewhere we have argued that grit is in part an epistemic matter:  the gritty person’s 
estimation of the likelihood that she will ultimately succeed is resilient against the impact of 
the evidence provided by experiences of failure, rejection, injury, and other setbacks.13  The 
conjecture is that in many cases, agents who give up on their difficult goals do so in part 
because they come to doubt that they will succeed even if they continue to try.  This can 
happen for a variety of reasons, but one reason an agent might lose confidence is that she is 
                                                   
10 Duckworth (2016). 
11 It depends upon the case, of course.  If the goal is morally or politically important – bringing about the end 
of apartheid, say – then it can be reasonable to pursue it even while believing the chances of success are very 
small (though in such cases, one usually orients oneself primarily toward smaller, more achievable goals).  
Similarly, if the agent is deeply passionate about her goal to the exclusion of other values in life, it might be 
reasonable to take the long shot – though we should not underestimate the significance of the opportunity costs 
incurred by devoting all of one’s time and energy to one risky activity. 
12 We leave it open here whether there might also be ethical considerations that favor having the capacity for 
grit, in addition to the instrumental benefits the capacity often confers (though not always – it can be 
disadvantageous to be gritty in some contexts). 
13 Morton and Paul (forthcoming.).  Albert Bandura pioneered the research on self-efficacy beliefs and their 
importance to achievement (Bandura (1989)).   
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responding to genuine evidence that her efforts will not ultimately be rewarded.  Losing a 
race, getting a journal rejection, or receiving a negative review of one’s photo exhibition are 
not only emotionally painful experiences; they are also a sign that you will not achieve your 
goal even if you persevere.  If this is right, then the gritty person tends to maintain sufficient 
confidence that her efforts will ultimately succeed – not necessarily outright believing that 
she will triumph, but considering it likely enough to merit continuing to try and thereby 
paying the corresponding opportunity costs.14  In other words, she is epistemically resilient 
in the face of negative evidence. 
 There are a variety of ways to achieve this kind of resilience, many of which are likely 
to be epistemically irrational: we can ignore obvious evidence suggesting we may fail, or 
nurture positive illusions about our own capabilities.  However, the mechanism of evidential 
thresholds helps us to see how epistemic resilience is available even to an agent who does not 
ignore evidence, and who bases her beliefs solely on evidence.  The thought is that insofar as 
the capacity for grit is advantageous to an agent, this consideration can legitimately bear on 
the evidential policies she reasons with, after purely epistemic considerations have been 
exhausted.  Other things equal, within the set of policies that are epistemically permissible, 
she ought to reason with a “grit-friendly” policy.  Such a policy would lead her to raise her 
evidential threshold with respect to the question “will I succeed at f-ing if I continue to try?” 
once she adopts f as an end, relative to the threshold that would govern her answer to that 
question if f-ing were not her adopted end, and relative to that which would tend to govern 
her evaluation of another person’s prospects.  In other words, a gritty agent will require more 
compelling evidence to revise her initial belief about the likelihood that she will succeed at 
her own ends than she would require if she had not adopted those ends, or than a 
disinterested observer would tend to require in reasoning about the same question.  And this 
need not be epistemically irrational, as long as her threshold is not so high that she is resistant 
to evidence of impending failure that is too compelling to permit of rational disagreement. 
Again, to be clear, the claim is not that it is rational to reason about what to believe 
on the basis of considerations showing perseverance to be valuable.  Further, conduciveness 
to grit is only one such consideration, and will thus contribute only pro tanto rational pressure 
that may be outweighed by other considerations.  But if the “Evidential Threshold Account” 
is on the right track, the agent may well be entitled to believe that her chances of success are 
better than an equally rational observer with the same evidence takes them to be.  The 
                                                   
14 Again, the requisite amount of optimism will vary depending on the alternatives available.  It is far easier to 
make sense of persevering if you take yourself to have no other options, either because you are desperate (“It’s 
either crawl across the desert with a gunshot wound to the gut, or die trying”) or because you are so passionate 
about your goal that the alternatives seem worse than failure (“Becoming a celebrated painter is the only thing 
that will make my life worth living”).  It is more difficult if there are other options available that one considers 
pretty good, and that can easily start to appear easier to succeed at when things are not going well with one’s 
current commitments.  An agent in this latter situation – which we take to be most common – will be especially 
vulnerable to quitting as a result of encountering setbacks, if the evidential import of those setbacks causes her 
estimation of her eventual success to drop too low. 
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disinterested observer might reasonably think that enough evidence is in to conclude that the 
agent’s prospects are dim, whereas the agent reasonably thinks that the jury is still out. 
 
III.  Believing in others:  an ethical requirement? 
 
All of this background deserves much more argument, some of which we have tried 
to give elsewhere.  But for now, let us take the framework for granted and reframe the 
question in the following way:  how, if at all, should our evidential policies be shaped by our 
relationships?  A tempting first response is that no matter who we are, or with whom we have 
relationships, we can have any of the evidential policies that are epistemically permissible.  
Even if the disinterested observer would tend to use a lower evidential threshold to update 
her beliefs about an agent’s eventual success than the agent herself would, there would be 
nothing wrong with using the same threshold as the agent, as long as it is in the range of what 
is epistemically permissible.  This is true, but it is not a full answer to our question.  While 
there may be nothing epistemically to choose between policies that are within the permissible 
range, it does not follow that they are equally justified, all things considered.  An evidential 
policy might be epistemically permissible but defective from a practical or ethical point of 
view. 
Second, it is important to reiterate that our focus is on cases in which the other has 
made no promise to succeed, and has not otherwise explicitly invited one to rely on his 
succeeding.  Other discussions of this question have tended to treat it as an issue of trust, not 
merely in the sense of acquiring evidence-based knowledge through testimony, but in the 
sense of trusting the other to follow through on a vow.  This is certainly an important topic 
in its own right, but the role of the promise or invitation to trust adds additional complexity 
that we prefer to do without.  It is prima facie plausible that we might have an obligation to 
believe in our significant others even if they have made no promise, and even if they 
themselves are uncertain about pulling it off.  So for our purposes, the relevant cases are 
those in which you simply come to know by some means or other that a friend, family 
member, colleague, mentee, or other person with whom you have a significant relationship 
has adopted a difficult end.15 
Here is a first proposal:  certain significant relationships constitutively involve treating 
the other’s ends as one’s own, such that failing to do so is ipso facto a defect in the relationship.  
A broadly Aristotelian form of this thought is that our friends are “another self.”16  While we 
might have good will toward many people, and wish them well, this is not sufficient in a 
significant relationship.  The latter requires an active merging of interests, such that the 
other’s good becomes one’s own good.  To prioritize one’s own ends, or otherwise to treat 
one’s own success as more significant that the success of one’s significant others, would be to 
fail at a central demand of the relationship.  If this is right, it would follow straightforwardly 
                                                   
15 Even if the other communicates to us that they have the end, we are deeply skeptical (pace Hinchman (2005)) 
that merely telling someone that P is in itself an invitation to trust in the sense that engages ethical obligations. 
16 Nicomachean Ethics, Book 8. 
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that we should employ the same optimistic evidential policies that facilitate epistemic 
resilience in our own case when our significant others’ aspirations are concerned. 
But although the metaphor of treating the other’s ends “as one’s own” is appealing, 
we suggest that it becomes problematic when taken together with other aspects of having a 
significant relationship with someone.  It is simply not true in general that we can relate to 
others’ ends in just the same way we relate to our own.  In normal cases, at least, we take an 
end to be our own only if, and largely because, we deem it to be worthy of pursuit.  As this 
point is sometimes put, our own ends are “transparent” to the justification for pursuing 
them.17  This fact is already built in to the Evidential Threshold Account as it applies in the 
first-personal case, since our evidential threshold should only be raised only after we have 
settled on the end and thereby (normally) deemed it to be choiceworthy.  Of course, we may 
be wrong about this – it may not in fact be a good end to pursue.  But from the first-personal 
perspective, perseverance is only intelligible if the goal continues to be viewed as worthy of 
pursuit. 
The problem is that our significant others can, and often do, adopt ends that are 
different from those we think they should have.  They go in for careers we think they are ill-
suited for, or even that we think are morally dubious.  They commit to relationships with 
people we think are unworthy of them.  They devote themselves to hobbies that we simply 
cannot see the point of.  The full-bore Aristotelian view seems to be that we cannot achieve 
the fullest form of friendship with someone whose ends we do not take to be good.  But this 
is a deeply implausible view of friendship, and even more implausible when it comes to 
romantic partners and family members.  The relationship of a parent to his child is not 
diminished by the fact that the child does not have the ends he thinks she should have.  
Rather, though we can have genuine relationships with people whose ends we take to be 
foolish or even wrong, we cannot straightforwardly treat those ends as our own. 
One might counter that in order to be optimistic about our significant others’ chances 
of succeeding, we do not have to accept their reasons for acting.  After all, our prediction 
about whether they will succeed ought to be based on evidence, and not whether we want 
them to succeed.  But while this is true, it is difficult to reconcile this stance with the “another 
self” rationale we are considering.  Justifiable optimism that the other will succeed in her 
goals depends on expecting that she will continue to try.  But if we judge that her goal is not 
choiceworthy, and if we are conceiving of her as another self, then we must desire that she 
come to see this and abandon it – after all, that is what we would want for ourselves.  Practical 
reasoning in service of this desire will therefore pull apart from theoretical reasoning that is 
resistant to reasons for doubting that she will succeed.  To predict that she will fail to see the 
reasons to abandon her unworthy end would be to abdicate the responsibility to help bring 
it about that she does, and this is a responsibility we cannot evade if we are genuinely treating 
the end as our own. 
                                                   
17 Although for doubts about the claim that they are fully transparent, see Paul (2012). 
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In light of these worries, we might consider a version of the first proposal that is 
restricted to those ends for which transparency holds – the ends of our significant others that 
we ourselves think they ought to have.  The thought would be that we ought to reason with 
epistemically resilient evidential policies only when we ourselves endorse the other’s project; 
otherwise, we should reason about them in the same way we would about a stranger.  This 
might be a coherent possibility, but we suggest that it is problematically patronizing.  It is less 
an expansion of the boundaries of the self than it is an incorporation of others.  What is 
missing from the “other self” picture is precisely that the other is not you – she is an 
autonomous being in her own right, whose capacity to set ends for herself should be 
respected.  Some significant relationships are legitimately patronizing, such as parenting 
young children, coaching, and teaching.  Such relationships might also be conditional on the 
other being committed to a particular project.  But with respect to friendship, romantic 
relationships, and relationships with older children, we suggest that it is a defect of the 
relationship for our reasoning about whether they will succeed to distinguish sharply between 
the ends that we would have chosen for them and those we would not have.  This kind of 
patronizing partiality would be at odds with the respect for the other’s autonomy that the 
ideal forms of these relationships plausibly involve. 
In light of this objection, let us turn our attention to a second proposal:  perhaps we 
ought to extend our optimistic evidential policies to our significant others out of respect for 
their agency, or capacity to set ends for themselves.  The difficulty here is to understand what 
“respect for others’ agency” comes to in more concrete terms.  One obvious possibility is that 
there is a universal, Kantian requirement to take others’ capacity for end-setting as seriously 
as one takes one’s own.  The rationale for this kind of approach begins with emphasizing the 
limits of the transparency even of our own ends.  It is not the case that we must believe each 
of our ends to be the most worthy option available to us; rather, we often take ourselves to be 
choosing between a wide variety of ends that are all permissible, or that exemplify 
incomparable kinds of value.  In these normatively underdetermined situations, we must 
commit to one of the permissible ends even though we judge the other options to be just as 
choiceworthy.  And insofar as we view our own commitments as normatively significant for 
us, over and above the significance of our reasons for action, the thought is that we should 
view the legislation of other wills to be equally significant, even when they are not fully 
supported by the reasons as we see them.   
Clearly, though, a universal requirement will not serve to vindicate epistemic 
partiality.  It might be, as Kant seems to have held, that respect for autonomy wherever we 
find it grounds a duty of beneficence not to unduly interfere with the ability of others to 
pursue their ends, and to help promote the ends of others on some occasions.  Such a duty 
could justify behavior that is effectively partial, in that we might have more opportunities to 
promote the ends of those with whom we interact frequently.  However, the relationships 
themselves would make no intrinsic difference.  Even more problematically for our purposes, 
any attempt to cash out the idea of respect for the agency of others in terms of optimistic 
evidential policies will likely turn out to be incoherent.  Many of our ends are difficult to 
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achieve precisely because they are competitive:  not everyone can win the race, or get the 
job, or be the voice of their generation.  To be more optimistic about one’s friend’s chances 
of success in such cases is ipso facto to be less sanguine about the chances of someone else. 
 A more promising version of this second proposal looks to locate a norm specific to 
our significant relationships that requires a kind of regard for their practical commitments 
that does not extend to all agents.  Stroud suggests that a bias toward interpreting evidence 
about our friends’ deeds and character in a positive light would make sense if friendship were 
constitutively contingent on esteem for our friends’ merits.18  Threats to our esteem for our 
friends would act as threats to the relationship itself; thus, concern for the relationship might 
justify being resistant to such threats.  An analogous thought might be that our significant 
relationships constitutively involve special esteem for the other qua agent, and that this 
underwrites a bias against believing they are likely to fail in their projects.   
If understood as esteem for their ability to succeed, the proposal is patently false – it is 
not a constitutive element of friendship or any of the other relationships under consideration 
here that we view the other as a winner. In fact, the truth more plausibly runs in the other 
direction.  If our friendship, collegiality, or willingness to mentor another person is 
conditional on them being successful, this is a defect in the relationship.  However, perhaps 
there is a form of esteem for our significant others’ agency that is in tension not with doubting 
that they will succeed, but rather with doubting the reality of their commitments to their professed 
ends.  By ‘reality’, we mean something like ‘prioritizing the goal as much as they profess to’.  
It is certainly possible to doubt that another person will lose 20 pounds on a diet, or run a 
marathon, or write a book simply because you do not think they are really committed to that 
goal.  You would expect this lack of commitment to be manifested in procrastination, for 
example, or a propensity to put other things first – the diet always gives way to special 
occasions, or the writing must always be put aside in favor of some other obligation like 
helping a friend move.  Doubt on these grounds is distinct from skepticism that they have 
the needed ability, or that the circumstances will favor them, or even that they have the will-
power needed to resist interfering temptations – since a lack of will-power can only be 
manifested in the presence of a sincere commitment.  The expectation is not that they will 
try and fail, but rather that they will never really get going. 
In our view, this latter version of the proposal is the most promising candidate for an 
ethical requirement concerning our beliefs about our significant others’ agency:  that there 
should be a presumption against doubting the reality of their practical commitments.  In the 
next section, we will attempt to sketch the shape this presumption should take. 
 
IV.  Strawson, Sartre, commitment, and success 
 
The first point to make is that in the context of a significant relationship, there is a 
heightened presumption of honesty, and a correspondingly heightened presumption that the 
                                                   
18 Stroud (2006), 511. 
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other’s sincere assertions should be taken to be truthful.  If the other avows that he is fully 
committed to becoming a professional beekeeper, there would be a distinctive wrong 
involved in concluding without good reason that his assertion is dishonest – it would be to 
suppose that he has violated a special obligation to you.  This observation does not go very 
far in this context, however, for at least two reasons.  One reason is that in doubting the 
reality of his commitment, we need not suppose that he is being dishonest with anyone other 
than himself.  In the most common kind of case, the other believes he is fully committed to 
his goal, and is sincere in his assertion that he is, even though he is not actually disposed to 
make a real effort.  The second reason is that the avowal seems to be unnecessary to generate 
the relevant obligation.  The tension arises even if we discovered in another way that he takes 
himself to have the end, and to have made it a genuine priority.      
Why might it wrong him to suspect that this is so?  Here we will to some extent follow 
Marušić, who follows Sartre and Strawson, in speaking of different stances we can take 
toward a person.19  To put it in our own preferred terminology, the problem stems from 
adopting a diagnostic stance on another when she is presenting herself to us as a rational agent.  
To think of a person from a diagnostic perspective is to assess their condition on the basis of 
evidence that may include, but that is not limited to, their representation of themselves as 
acting, believing, and feeling for certain reasons.  For instance, if Jorge claims to be upset 
because his partner acted inconsiderately, and his partner responds by telling Jorge that he 
is only upset because he is hungry, this would be to shift into the diagnostic perspective rather 
than to take Jorge’s professed reasons at face value.  
There can be a kind of disrespect involved in taking the diagnostic perspective that is 
distinct from simply suspecting the other of dishonesty.  It is decidedly difficult to articulate 
what this disrespect consists in, but it seems to be connected with viewing a person as an 
object whose behavior can be explained and predicted like any other mechanism.  Plausibly, 
we want our significant others to view us as largely rational beings to be engaged with on 
rational terms, rather than as mechanisms to be theorized about.  A very strong conclusion 
to draw from this point is that it is always prima facie wrong to address or represent our 
significant others diagnostically when a rational perspective is available.  But we think this 
goes much too far; after all, we are also objects, and our behaviors do have causes that are 
not rational.  It is not an inherent defect in a relationship to acknowledge this aspect of our 
nature; indeed, we will only fully be understood by the people who care for us if it is 
acknowledged.  As Marušić points out, there are two kinds of bad faith on Sartre’s view:  
denying an agent’s freedom, and denying her facticity.20 
What is needed, then, is a way to think about how these demands should be balanced 
in the context of a relationship.  Marušić proposes that this should be viewed as a demand 
to trust the other by accepting her answer to a question as our own, tempered by an 
assessment of whether the other is in fact trustworthy.21  For reasons that we have explained, 
                                                   
19 Marušić (2015); Strawson (1962); Sartre (1943). 
20 Mark Schroeder also investigates this theme, in a way we are sympathetic to, in “Persons as Things” (ms.). 
21 200-202. 
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we believe an account is needed that extends more widely to conditions in which trust is not 
centrally at issue.  We suggest instead that significant relationships demand resistance to 
adopting the diagnostic perspective that can be overcome not merely by evidence of 
untrustworthiness, but more generally by certain kinds of evidence indicating the presence 
of a rational breakdown such as self-deception. The proposal is that in the context of a 
significant relationship, the default perspective should be the rational perspective (when 
available), and that one should require significant and specific evidence of a rational 
breakdown before switching to the diagnostic mode.    
This kind of resistance can be modeled using the Evidential Threshold Account, 
although that is certainly not the only way to understand it.  The thought would be that the 
switch from the rational to the diagnostic perspective should be governed by evidence, and 
that the threshold should be higher in the context of a significant relationship than it is when 
addressing a stranger or mere acquaintance.22  There might be nothing objectionable, for 
instance, about conjecturing without much evidence that your neighbor’s professed New 
Year’s resolution to start exercising regularly will come to nothing.  But when the aspiring 
exerciser is a friend, lover, or other instance of significant other, one should have good 
evidence that something is rationally amiss before switching to the diagnostic perspective.  
The higher evidential threshold embodies a bias in favor of engaging on rational terms with 
our friends, at least when it comes to their capacity to set ends for themselves. 
What kind of evidence counts as compelling in such contexts?  We cannot offer 
anything like a full answer here, but one especially vexing kind of case concerns a pattern of 
past behavior.  What to think when one’s friend has “committed” to a relationship or a diet 
many times in the past, only to make clear in his complete lack of follow-through that the 
commitment was meaningless to him?  It is tempting to suppose that a pattern such as this 
justifies us in assuming next time that his “commitment” is just as unreal.  But the Sartrean 
insight here is that the agential perspective requires us to deny that our past determines what 
we will do in the future.  This perspective is extremely difficult to maintain, however, when 
one’s closest companions are convinced that it does – that we will never change, and are 
prisoners of our past mistakes.  Respect for the agency of our significant others demands that 
we refrain from undermining their ability to see themselves as capable of setting genuine 
ends for themselves going forward.  And if we are to see them as agents, rather than merely 
as objects compelled by non-rational forces, we must not foreclose the possibility that their 
future might depart from the pattern we have witnessed thus far. Therefore, we think that 
past behavior alone should generally not constitute the kind of evidence that compels us to 
switch to the diagnostic mode and view the other in light of his facticity.  There can be 
exceptions, when for instance we take the other to be self-deceived about past failures and 
thus unable to have learned anything from them.  But in general, the thought is that we are 
                                                   
22 This is not to deny that there might be an ethical obligation to view all persons from the rational perspective, 
if possible.  If that is the case, then our claim is that this obligation is heightened in the context of a significant 
relationship.  It might also be that the requirement in the case of friendship is more nuanced than our brief 
remarks suggest, and that it varies with the kind of proposition one is considering.   
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better friends to the extent that we view each new commitment as genuine, even if the past 
has been otherwise. 
If this is right, then we can wrong our significant others by doubting the sincerity of 
their commitments, if this doubt is the product of an overly low evidential threshold for 
adopting the diagnostic perspective.  This is the sense in which our relationships 
constitutively require a limited form of respect for one another’s agency, for we are agents 
primarily from the rational perspective.  Not all instances of doubting the sincerity of the 
other’s commitment wrong them, since we can have compelling evidence for our doubts, but 
some instances do.  To this extent, we can be justified in having more optimistic expectations 
about our significant others’ endeavors than a stranger with the same evidence would tend 
to have.  
On our view, however, this point does not get us as far as some Sartreans suppose.  
As we understand it, merely taking the other’s commitment to the end to be genuine is far 
from enough to expect that he will actually succeed.  It is simply to expect that if he fails, it 
will not be because he abandoned the goal without ever really trying.23  To exhibit respect 
for another’s capacity to set ends for herself does not require optimism that her abilities, 
opportunities, and self-discipline will be enough to get the job done.  To suppose that it does, 
one must suppose that sincerely trying to f entails succeeding at f-ing.  But in the cases at 
issue, when the agent has adopted a difficult, long-term end, we usually have no good reason 
to believe that such an entailment holds.  The central question at issue in reasoning about 
whether they will ultimately succeed is “Is f-ing up to them, such that if they continue to try, 
they will succeed?”  And this question can only be answered by reflecting on the evidence 
we have concerning their abilities, the kinds of opportunities we expect them to be offered, 
their capacity to resist temptation and sacrifice for the sake of the goal, and so forth.  In other 
words, it is a diagnostic question.24 
 
V.  Believing in others:  an instrumental requirement? 
 
 Let us now approach the topic from a different angle.  We have been exploring ethical 
considerations bearing on how we should view our significant others.  One such 
consideration that we have not yet mentioned is that all of these relationships constitutively 
involve caring for the well-being of the other.  As long as the ends they have set for themselves 
are not exceedingly foolish, dangerous, or morally wrong, we want them to succeed and 
thereby flourish according to their own standards.  We want them to persevere when the 
                                                   
23 This might be too quick, since it may be possible genuinely to have an end without ever doing anything to 
further it.  For instance, if the agent has other commitments that she considers far more central or important, 
then these commitments might happen to supersede the less important end on any occasion where she would 
otherwise have acted to further it.  We might nevertheless take the end to be genuine in virtue of accepting 
counterfactuals in which the more important commitments are absent and the agent does try to accomplish the 
end.  Thanks to Ben Bagley for raising this possibility. 
24 We argue for this point in more detail in Morton and Paul (forthcoming). 
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chances of success are good enough, given the alternatives available to them, and if they can 
afford the risk of failure.  That said, we also want them to bow out gracefully and pursue a 
different end when it has become clear that the outlook is too unpromising to justify the 
opportunity costs, or when failure would be too catastrophic to risk.  Given this goal, are 
there further instrumental pressures on us to reason about their prospects in a way that will 
tend to promote their well-being? 
The difficulty lies in teasing apart the various ways in which our actions and speech 
can affect whether others persevere from any distinctive practical role that our beliefs might 
play.  The first-personal case is more straightforward in this way, since we cannot easily or 
effectively act toward ourselves as though we are more confident in our chances than we 
really are.  In the case of others, in contrast, there are a variety of ways in which we can 
influence their choices about when to give up without necessarily having the optimistic belief 
ourselves.  For this reason, the instrumental considerations that favor grit-friendly policies in 
the first-personal case do not apply in just the same way to the case of others. 
In some cases, we can directly influence whether the other perseveres, insofar as we 
wield authority over whether they give up.  A parent or coach, for example, might be in a 
position to forbid their charge to quit.  Angela Duckworth emphasizes the importance of 
parenting for developing and enabling grit, and in particular, a “wise” parenting style that 
imposes limits on when their children are allowed to give up on a pursuit once they have 
started it.25  In one of her examples of good parenting, she recounts that “Steve and his 
siblings were made to understand that, whatever they signed up for, they had to see it through 
to the end.”  This parenting technique counters the effect of confidence-diminishing 
experiences on the child simply by taking the decision about whether to persevere out of the 
child’s hands.   
In other cases, the influence is indirect.  An agent’s significant others can have a 
substantial effect on her choices about whether to persevere by shaping her relevant attitudes.  
This point applies not only to the agent’s beliefs, but also to her preferences and evaluative 
judgments.  A coach, parent, or friend might help the agent persevere in the face of difficulty 
by reminding her what she loves about the activity, and why it is a worthy goal to have.  This 
can help combat the influence of “sour grapes:” the tendency to devalue a goal or cease to 
prefer an outcome as a result of finding it to be difficult to achieve.26  The aspiring academic 
might receive several journal rejections in a row, and be led as a result to change her mind 
about the value of becoming a professional academic – “it’s just a bunch of smug navel-
gazers talking to each other about things that don’t really matter, anyway.”  Her significant 
others might then try to direct her attention back to the reasons for taking an academic career 
to be valuable and worthy of pursuit.  They might also try to convince her that perseverance 
itself is valuable, and that even if academia ultimately does not work out, she does not want 
to be the kind of person who quits as soon as she encounters a setback.  
                                                   
25 Duckworth (2016), chapter 10. 
26 Elster (1983). 
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More importantly for our purposes, they can do something similar if the agent starts 
to lose confidence that her efforts will eventually pay off. Suppose the Ph.D. student 
interprets the journal rejections as evidence that she is incapable of doing work that will be 
considered excellent by the gatekeepers of the discipline.  She thus comes to believe that the 
chances that she will write a passing dissertation and get a tenure-track job are too low to 
justify continuing to try, thereby paying high opportunity costs.  Her advisers might suggest 
ways of understanding the new evidence that are compatible with a more optimistic 
prognosis.  They might point out that referees can be inattentive, biased, or intoxicated, or 
provide examples of people who are successful in the field who received similar rejections.  
Or they might offer reasons for the student to believe that her abilities are not immutable, 
and that her work could improve with effort.  By spinning the evidence in this way, they 
might lead the student to believe that her chances of success are higher than she otherwise 
would have, and thus help her to see perseverance as justified.27 
The effectiveness of this kind of spin will vary, of course, with the rationality of the 
agent and the credibility of the spin doctor.  When our parents try to encourage us to be 
more optimistic in this way concerning endeavors that they are not especially familiar with, 
it often does not work.  If our rational faculties are functioning well enough, the interpretation 
of the evidence being offered must strike us as plausible enough to accept on epistemic 
grounds.  In this respect, seeing the significant other as sufficiently expert to have a legitimate 
perspective on the evidence is important.  Of course, in some cases, the agent is motivated 
enough to remain optimistic that she is willing to grasp at straws and accept obviously 
distorted views of the evidence. 
For a rational agent, it will also depend on how much leeway there is for reasonable 
disagreement.  The goals and activities that allow for the most latitude in this respect will 
tend to be long-term, such that the prediction about whether the agent will succeed if she 
continues to try concerns the far future.  Relatedly, they will be better to the extent that they 
specify no firm deadline for success.  Reasonable disagreement over what to predict in light 
of the current evidence will often concern how much room there is for change.  Are the 
requisite abilities amenable to improvement, or do there tend to be hard limits?  How likely 
is it that the circumstances will become more favorable?  Are we capable of reforming our 
various tendencies to undermine ourselves?  The evidence bearing on these questions will 
often be inconclusive, leaving room for reasonable disagreement.  This is a respect in which 
our cases are importantly different from Stroud’s central example, which concerns an event 
that has already happened.  Evidence concerning a past event can be inconclusive, but not 
because there is still room to affect what will happen. 
The question is now:  in this kind of situation, what should you actually believe?  It is 
clearly possible to engage in this practice and thereby encourage someone to have a belief 
that one does not share oneself.  Thus, many of the pragmatic benefits to the agent of being 
                                                   
27 Bandura’s work on self-efficacy beliefs supports the claim that parents, teachers, and coaches can significantly 
influence educational outcomes and career trajectories by way of influencing the student’s sense of self-efficacy. 
For a review see Usher and Pajares (2008). 
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supportive can be had without going so far as to have the optimistic belief oneself.  Framing 
the question this way therefore helps us to focus on the demands that our relationships might 
place on us that apply directly to our beliefs, and not only to the consequences of acting as 
though one believes. 
There are instrumental reasons that favor simply using the same evidential policies 
to reason about our friends’ success as we use in our own case, and thus sharing the optimistic 
belief we are trying to get them to have.  For one thing, we should not overestimate the 
effectiveness of encouraging others to adopt an interpretation of the evidence that one does 
not share oneself.  Those who know us well will tend to discern the truth, and discount our 
suggestions accordingly.  Thus, to really help our significant others have the beliefs they 
should have, it will be most effective if we simply occupy that evidential perspective ourselves.   
Further, there is something manipulative about encouraging others to have a belief 
one does not share oneself.  To push them to see the evidence differently than you see it 
might strike us as disrespectful, in a way that is similar to the disrespect sometimes involved 
in taking the diagnostic stance on them:  we are operating on them, even as we persuade by 
appeal to rational considerations.  Insofar as we are pushing them to have a belief that we 
take to be somewhat mistaken, this is deceptive – if benevolently so.  To the extent that even 
benevolent deception is to be avoided within the context of significant relationships, this is a 
consideration that favors simply having the optimistic belief oneself.  
However, it is tricky to pin down how exactly this form of benevolent deception wrongs 
the other.  After all, if our view of permissible evidential resilience is correct, in encouraging 
others to be optimistic we will actually be pushing them toward the belief that they ought to 
have.  If the wrong of manipulation is that it leads an agent to pursue a goal that she would 
not otherwise choose for herself, this kind of wrong is not present; by hypothesis, by propping 
up her confidence that her efforts will pay off, we are leading her only to pursue a goal that 
she did choose for herself.  Of course, we can wrong her by overdoing it; if we push her to 
take such a rosy view of her prospects that she crosses over into delusional optimism, we are 
depriving her of the opportunity to see that giving up and pursuing another alternative might 
be a better choice.  The point is only that she might be rationally permitted to be more 
optimistic than we are, and that the result of the manipulation might therefore be 
unobjectionable. 
Sarah Buss has argued that, in fact, this sort of benign manipulation is often a part of 
romantic relationships and other aspects of our lives.28 Imagine that Adhira invites her friend 
Misha to a Jens Lekman concert. In convincing him to go, she might focus his attention on 
potentially enjoyable aspects of the evening, despite knowing that Misha is skeptical of the 
entertainment value of Swedish singer-songwriters, because she also knows that he will have 
a good time if he does join her. If the goal – to enjoy a concert together – is one that Misha 
values and would endorse, and there is no deceit involved, then any wrong here is of a fairly 
benign sort. In fact, it is often perceptible out of the corner of one’s eye that this sort of ‘spin’ 
                                                   
28 Buss (2005). 
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is part of what is going on. When the coach cheers her trainee on from the sidelines, the 
swimmer need not be outright deceived about what the coach is up to (though he might well 
refrain from reflecting explicitly on her motives). And if he believes that being confident is 
going to help him succeed, he might reasonably expect his coach to spin the evidence 
positively to encourage him. Of course, Misha and the swimmer cannot examine this aspect 
of the interaction too closely without undermining the desired effect, but it is not unusual to 
want to be swept up by non-rational influences in order to fall in love, enjoy an evening 
together, or enter the race with a strut in our step. 
These considerations do not justify outright deception or lying by our significant 
others even if it is for our own good. It is important in our account that what is at stake here 
is positive spin, not doctoring or withholding evidence, and that doing so is only acceptable 
when there is sufficient reason to think that the agent does have a chance at success. Our 
friends are not doing us any favors in having us believe that we can run a marathon in under 
three hours if we can barely break ten minutes in the mile. Most of us care about having an 
accurate picture of the world and not wasting our time by setting ends for ourselves that are 
impossible.  However, they do cast doubt on the conclusion that we are permitted to engage 
in positive spin only if we ourselves believe the conclusion we are urging upon our friend. 
Moreover, there are respects in which viewing our friends’ prospects in an optimistic 
light and being resilient against evidence to the contrary can do them a disservice.  The idea 
that we should all reason in the just the same way in these cases ignores the value of dividing 
the epistemic labor among the members of a social group.  As difficult as it is to disagree with 
our loved ones, it is also important to have access to the alternative perspectives they can 
provide – especially when the agent is prone to being overconfident rather than 
underconfident.  This kind of agent will be benefitted most by a good dose of pessimism, 
leading her to take stock and deal with the obstacles in her way.  We also depend on others 
to make it safer for us to fail, as it were.  The agent herself must orient her reasoning primarily 
toward accomplishing her goal, since she is the one who must persevere if she is to succeed.  
But those around her can manifest concern for her well-being by being closely attuned to the 
evidence that she may not succeed.  Relatively pessimistic expectations may focus our 
attention on doing what we can to ensure that alternative opportunities remain open to the 
agent; to find ways to make her setbacks less painful for her; to encourage her to develop a 
healthy attitude toward the relative unimportance of success, and so forth.  It may be in her 
best interest that we never directly share our pessimism with her, but having less-than-
optimistic evidential policies concerning her endeavors can be a way of being a good friend, 
mentor, or parent. 
 This investigation is far from exhaustive, but we tentatively conclude that a concern 
for the well-being of our significant others does not univocally push in one direction.  It seems 
to us that it is permissible to be the kind of friend or mentor that is genuinely optimistic, and 
also permissible to be the kind that aims to be as clear-eyed and responsive to the warning 
signs as possible.  In fact, the ideal social context for aspiration might be one that includes 
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both kinds.  We need allies who genuinely share our perspective on the world, but we also 
need allies whose priority is to protect us from what we cannot as easily see. 
 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
 The upshot of our discussion is fairly modest.  The initial question was “should our 
relationship with A shape our beliefs about whether A will succeed at his or her ends?”  Our 
view, defended here and in other work, is that it matters whether A is oneself.  Whether or 
not the capacity for grit is beneficial to have depends partly on the agent’s context, but in 
circumstances where it is beneficial, our theoretical reasoning should be shaped to a limited 
extent in ways that promote resilience.  Here, we have argued that it is permissible to extend 
this optimistic reasoning style to one’s significant others, but not required.  We do not 
generally wrong our friends, mentees, colleagues, patients or children by drawing more 
pessimistic conclusions from the evidence than they do, or than we are epistemically 
permitted to do.  The exception to this concerns the sincerity of their commitments:  we have 
suggested that we can wrong them in doubting that they are as committed to the end as they 
take themselves to be, if we lack significant and specific evidence that this is so.  To doubt 
their capacity to set ends for themselves can strain the relationship because it amounts to 
questioning their identity as rational agents, and thus their capability of participating in equal 
interpersonal relationships.  But participating in equal and respectful relationships does not 
require specific abilities like long-distance running or dissertation-writing, and so this 
Strawsonian point does not tell against skepticism that they will actually achieve their ends.29 
 Our interest has been in the possibility of epistemic partiality that does not depend 
on the claim that we have practical obligations to believe against the evidence.30  We have 
not specifically argued that we have no such practical obligations, however.  Nor have we 
argued against the possibility that other attitudes like faith or hope might be required in these 
contexts, or that we might be obliged simply to suspend judgment altogether.  Our own view 
is that action should be guided by belief, and that to the extent that we cannot avoid acting 
in these circumstances, we also cannot avoid committing ourselves doxastically.  But these 
topics deserve more discussion than we can give them here. 
 Finally, a more general upshot of the discussion is that the capacity for agency is often 
socially embedded.  Many of the things we do “individually” would be much more difficult, 
if not impossible, without the influence of those around us.  The point is not just that we 
often engage in “shared agency,” by doing things together.  It is also that the capacity to stick 
                                                   
29 Although it might require more general confidence that the other will eventually negotiate a path in life and 
an articulation of her goals that is a good fit with her values, abilities, and opportunities.  Indeed, this might be 
a better interpretation of what we mean when we say we “believe in” someone.  Thanks to Peter Railton for a 
suggestion in this vein. 
30 It is worth noting that we have also avoided appeal to any “state-given reasons” provided by our relationships.  
Crawford (2017) argues that friendship constitutively requires having attitudes toward our friends that are 
responsive only to object-given reasons and not state-given reasons. 
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with a project is often mediated by others, not only in the effects of their actions, but in the 
very attitudes they hold toward you and what you aspire to do.  Whether you are able to see 
your own perseverance as reasonable and admirable rather than pigheaded and hopeless 
depends in part on how others see it.  This point will hardly come as a surprise, but it does 
perhaps recommend a shift in what the philosophy of action takes to be the central case in 
our theorizing. 
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